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Abstract
We develop a dynamic game to provide with a theory of Arab spring-
type events. We consider two interacting groups, the elite vs. the citizens,
two political regimes, dictatorship vs. a freer regime, the possibility to
switch from the ﬁrst to the second regime as a consequence of a revolution,
and ﬁnally the opportunity, for the elite, to aﬀect the citizens' decision
through concession and/or repression strategies. In this framework, we
provide a full characterization of the equilibrium of the political regime
switching game. First, we emphasize the role of the direct switching
cost of a revolution (for the citizens) and of the elite's self-preservation
options. Under the concession strategy, when the switching cost is low, the
elite can't avoid the political regime change. She optimally adapts to the
overthrow of their political power by setting the rate of redistribution to
the highest possible level, thereby extending the period during which she
has full control on resources. This surprising result actually illustrates the
role of the timing of events in these situations of interaction between the
ruling elite and the people. When the direct switching is high, the elite
can ultimately select the equilibrium outcome and adopts the opposite
strategy, i.e. she chooses the lowest level of redistribution that allows her
to stay in power forever. The same kind of results are obtained when
the elite relies on repression to keep the citizens under control. Next, the
equilibrium properties under a mix of repression and redistribution are
analyzed. It is shown that in situations where neither repression (only)
nor redistribution (only) protect the elite against the uprising of citizens, a
subtle mixture of the two instruments is suﬃcient to make the dictatorship
permanent. Based on our theoretical results, we ﬁnally examine the reason
for such a large variety of decisions and outcomes during the Arab Spring
events.
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1 Introduction
The Arab spring, which started in Tunisia in late 2010, is arguably the most
important event of the beginning of this century, certainly comparable to the
fall of Berlin's Wall in 1989. While the political and geostrategic consequences
of this event are not yet settled, it's enough to look a few months or years
backward to realize how it is important and somehow striking: who could expect
in early 2011 that ﬁerce dictators and regimes as those of Benali or Mubarak
will be ousted after quite a few weeks of heavy protests and demonstrations?
Who could expect the cascade of events which have aﬀected the whole Arab
world after the Tunisian Jasmine revolution? After so many decades of brutal
(and even insane) dictatorship, many analysts did lose hope in any institutional
evolution (not speaking about democratization!) in the Arab world before the
amazing sequence initialized in Tunisia. It's therefore fair to state that the Arab
spring came as a surprise, not only to political leaders around the world, but
also to the traditional media of the Arab World.1
i) A ﬁrst puzzling aspect of the Arab spring is henceforth the timing. Why
did Arab populations wait 4 or 5 decades (after independence) before
revolting? All these countries have in common the fact that they have been
ruled for decades by elites controlling ﬁercely the rents deriving either from
the exploitation of natural resources (that's oil and gas) or from economic
liberalization (like in Tunisia, celebrated as one of the most open Arab
countries by the World Bank's Doing Business successive surveys prior
to the Jasmine Revolution).2 What are the mechanisms leading from
such a regime with an omnipotent elite controlling the whole resource-
dependent economy and deciding about everything to a regime change
towards democracy?
ii) A second striking feature is the large variety of outcomes observed so
far. In some cases, the ruling parties and dynasties were eventually ousted
(as in Tunisia or Egypt) after weeks of political and social turmoil reg-
ularly punctuated by massive and sometimes deadly demonstrations. In
others, the same massive demonstrations have not been so successful and
the incumbents remained in oﬃce as in Bahrein: it is likely that the Shiite
demonstrators didn't expect the bloody intervention of Saudi Arabia (for
the Sunnite minority to keep power in Bahrein) when they started the up-
rising. Another case of external intervention is Libya, which resulted in the
opposite outcome: the ruling dictator and associated elite were violently
expelled by the opposition backed by NATO massive bombings. A much
1A funny example of this unawarness is this French minister spending her 2010 Christmas
holidays in Tunisia, and showing little concern about the situation even after the ﬁrst registered
deaths. The whole French government led by Sarkozy was apparently sure that the ﬁrm ally,
Benali, will be able to control the situation and stay in power at the end of the day!
2Egypt was ranked in the Top 10 of the most reforming countries in the world by Doing
Business in 2008/2009, and Tunisia was ranked 55th out of 183 in 2011 by Doing Business
ranking.
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less bloody case is Algeria: with a mixture of soft repression and massive
redistribution, the ruling elite has been able to retain the power (see Achy,
2011). Indeed, the January 2011 protests have led the Algerian govern-
ment to markedly enlarge the scope of its staple food subsidy program
and its youth employment support packages leading to a durable destruc-
turing of the national budget. The Regulation Fund, created in 2000 for
the stabilization of public expenditures thanks to the oils and gas exports,
has been used to ﬁnance the ongoing budget deﬁcits (about 50% of the
2011 budget deﬁcit was ﬁnanced by this Fund, according to Boucekkine
and Bouklia-Hassane, 2011), which endangers the public ﬁnance system
sustainability of this country. Morocco is another case where the elite (in
other words, the King) has prevented a major uprising so far by conducting
early institutional changes towards a constitutional monarchy (see Traub,
2012), signaling more redistribution of economic and political rights in
the future. This variety of outcomes calls for a deep theoretical research
on the use of redistribution/repression by ruling elites and the result-
ing economico-political equilibria. Two questions arise quite naturally:
Couldn't the ruling elite, with all the powers in hands, systematically
prevent the occurrence of such moves by taking the adequate decisions,
either ﬁerce/soft repression and/or massive/moderate redistribution of the
rents, in the right time? For a given repression/redistribution policy of
the elites, what does determine the decision of the opposition (that's the
vast majority of the population) to go for a revolution and the inherent
timing?
The two striking aspects described above suggest that the underlined phe-
nomena cannot be properly addressed without two key ingredients: in ﬁrst place,
the dynamic aspects to be able to fully understand the timing of the events, and
in second place, the strategic aspects with ruling elites acting as strategic leaders
in the initial regime. Accordingly, we shall develop a full-ﬂedged dynamic game
framework to provide with a comprehensive theory of Arab spring-type phenom-
ena as captured by the two features i) and ii). In this framework, we introduce
hierarchy: elites do act as strategic leaders. Moreover, the considered games ex-
plicitly distinguish between the pre-revolution regime (dictatorship of the elite)
and the post-revolution regime (say, common access to resources). Finally and
more importantly, the determination of (Markov perfect) equilibria includes the
timing of the transition (if it occurs) from the ﬁrst to the second regime. This
ultimately leads to a methodological innovation as the latter requires merging
dynamic games with multi-stage optimal control (see Boucekkine et al., 2013a
for the use of multi-stage optimal control in a non-strategic model of technology
adoption).3
In the ﬁrst regime, the elite has full control on the stock of resources (to be
taken in a broad sense, it could either come from an  unmodelled  extraction
3Two related papers are Long et al., 2013, and Boucekkine et al., 2011. But, among other
notable diﬀerences, the former does not have a strategic leader structure, and the latter is
only concerned with open-loop equilibria.
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sector or from economic resources derived from economic globalization, e.g.
from FDIs or import licenses for example) and decides about: i) how much
resources to transfer to population (redistribution or concession), ii) how much
to use for own consumption, iii) how much resources to employ for repression
(modelled as a ﬂow) and iv) how much to invest. The production function is AK
to have a chance to extract (partial) analytical results. Of course, redistribution
and/or repression are the instruments the elites may use (simultaneously or not,
we examine both cases) to retain the power (self-preservation) in exchange for
own consumption and investment. From the point of view of the elites, neither
redistribution nor repression make sense in the absence of a revolution threat.
Given the elites' policy, the opposition has to decide whether she rebels (or not)
against the elites and when (if she does so). A key aspect in the opposition
tradeoﬀ is the direct (political regime) switching costs (DSC hereafter) faced.
These costs depend either on the repression exerted by the elites and/or their
allies (possibly foreign countries) or on the coordination costs inherent in any
collective action. Knowing the resulting reaction function of the opposition, the
elites as strategic leaders will then choose their optimal redistribution and/or
repression policies. We shall address all the research questions listed above
within this far nontrivial framework.
In our analysis, we cannot explicitly model important aspects of the Arab
spring in order to come with a comprehensive enough analytical characteriza-
tion of the economico-political equilibria. As one can already guess from the
description just above, our simpliﬁed setting is already heavily sophisticated
from the algebraic point of view. In most of the cases, we are able however to
identify shortcuts allowing to partially account for the missing pieces such like
the education level or external military interventions. This is possible thanks
to our broad interpretation of the DSC. For example, concerning the level of
education, it's important to notice that the ﬁrst country of the Arab spring,
Tunisia, is the one which has invested the most in human capital in the recent
decades in % of the national budgets (for example, about 23% of the Tunisian
total public expenditures was devoted to education in 2008, according to the
World Bank's Edstats).4 If education increases the perception of grievance in
the face of unequal distribution of rents, then of course it should play a role
in the Arab spring story. Though we don't integrally consider such a channel
in our model, we might view it partially through exogenous moves in the DSC.
One might think that as the average education level of the countries becomes
high enough, it is deﬁnitely easier to coordinate on a collective action,5 thus
pushing down the DSC. The contrary occurs in the case of an exogenous in-
crease in repression due to external pro-elite intervention. A key aspect for the
existence and nature of the economico-political equilibria is the controllability
of the DSC by the elites. In reality, the DSC can be only partially controlled
by the elites. Control obviously results from repression and is also linked to
4The Gulf monarchies and Jordan invest also a lot in public education, although slightly
below 20% in the 2008 Edstats report.
5While this is a common idea in labour economics, see Becker and Murphy (1992), it seems
relevant in any context involving collective actions.
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education, given the importance of public education in these countries (see the
Tunisian case above). A signiﬁcant part of the DSC is however out of the con-
trol of the elites. Uncontrolled factors aﬀecting the cost of revolting against the
elites include opposite external military interventions (Libya or Syria), most of
the elements linked to globalization (e.g. the role of worldwide communication
networks), and demography. In this paper, we shall study the two polar cases:
the case where the DSC are fully controllable vs fully exogenous. The mixed
case is discussed in the last section before the conclusion.
Last but not least, we shall omit uncertainty. In the context of the Arab
spring, an important source of uncertainty originates in the size of the rents
(because of random resource prices in international markets for example). This
uncertainty is likely to aﬀect the elites' behaviour: in the Algerian case described
by Boucekkine and Bouklia-Hassane (2011), it is shown that the ruling nomen-
klatura is much more prone to political and economic liberalization in periods
where the oil prices are persistently low. Boucekkine et al. (2013b) have already
provided with a stochastic game modelling of the latter aspect but they omitted
the two fundamental components of our framework: elites as strategic leaders
and a multi-regime setting. Indeed, incorporating the latter components in a
proper stochastic dynamic game structure sounds as a daunting task.
Our research can be related to two distinct streams of the economic liter-
ature, one in the line of democratization games à la Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006, 2008) and the other one (see for instance, Torvik, 2002) viewing natu-
ral resources as a source of conﬂicts. It's deﬁnitely more closely related to the
former where a key question is the strategic behaviour of the elites as a central
actor of institutional change. While the dynamic aspect is not always absent (see
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008), no dynamic games with explicit state variable
and timing decisions are considered. We are not aware of any other paper along
this line dealing with the fundamental features i) and ii) outlined above. An
important aspect of the Arab spring and other democratization processes which
is well accounted for in Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) and which is missing in
our paper is the distinction between political power and economic power, and
therefore between political and economic liberalization. As mentioned above
about Tunisia and Egypt, what led to the disgrace of their respective dictators
is the lack of political liberalization while these economies are close to fully liber-
alized. Non-simultaneity of both liberalizations has been more than problematic
in these countries as analysed in Dunne and Revkin (2011). Concerning the sec-
ond stream, several authors have recently pointed out that resource abundance
induces political instability if competing factions try to obtain control over the
associated rents. Resources cause rent seeking and ﬁghting activities between
rival groups, which weaken property rights and lead to a curse (see Torvik, 2002,
Hodler, 2006, Mehlum et al., 2006, or Gonzalez, 2007). Cross-country evidence
suggests a positive correlation between rents from natural resources and civil
wars. Perhaps the major contribution along this line is the greed and grievance
story told by Collier and Hoeer (2004). In this seminal paper, the causes of
civil war are studied using a new data set of wars during 1960-99. The authors
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outline that rebellion may be explained by atypically severe grievances, such as
high inequality, a lack of political rights, or ethnic and religious divisions in so-
ciety. Accordingly, most subsequent studies have considered conﬂicts as a result
of grievance and greed between rival groups. Lower transfers to the opposition
might induce grief as they sense injustice, and conﬂict over resource rents are
further exacerbated when society is fractionalized by competing interest groups
(Caselli and Coleman, 2006). Perhaps the most comprehensive theories on re-
source wars so far are due to Acemoglu et al. (2012) and van der Ploeg and
Rohner (2012). In the latter for example, some mechanisms leading to this type
of wars are singled out in a quite comprehensive setting where rebels ﬁght a
government, and ﬁghting, armament, and extraction method, speed and invest-
ment, are all endogenous. Interestingly enough, rapacious resource exploitation
can be preferred in this context to balanced depletion due to lowered incentives
for future rebel attacks. Acemoglu et al. (2012) build their resource war model
in the framework of international trade with unequal endowment of resources
across countries. While in both cases the stories told are quite far from the Arab
spring, one can hardly build on their respective conceptual settings to infer a
theory for the latter. Indeed, a major ingredient of the Arab spring is lacking:
a strong hierarchical relationship from the strategic point of view between the
ruling elites and population. That's in the Arab spring story, the elites play the
role of strategic leaders. As correctly pointed out by Caselli and Cunnigham
(2009) in an excellent theoretical reﬂection on the channels through which re-
source rents will alter the incentives of a political leader,...these mechanisms
cannot be fully understood without simultaneously studying leader behaviour.
We eagerly adopt this point of view and build dynamic games theories for the
Arab spring with elites acting as strategic leaders. Pioneering works using dy-
namic games in contexts of strategic exploitation of resources by rival groups
are due to Tornell (1996) and Lane and Tornell (1996). We depart from these
contributions in two major ways. First, we do introduce hierarchy as mentioned
just above, and elites act as strategic leaders. Second, the considered games ex-
plicitly distinguish between the pre-revolution regime (dictatorship of the elite)
and the post-revolution regime (say, common access to resources). More impor-
tantly, the determination of (Markov perfect) equilibria includes the timing of
the transition (if it occurs) from the ﬁrst to the second regime.
On theoretical grounds, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the equilib-
rium of a political regime switching game when the elites adopt a redistribution
strategy and/or a repression policy. First, we emphasize the role of the di-
rect switching cost of the citizens and of the elite's self-preservation options by
focusing on the particular cases where the elites use a single instrument. Con-
cession made by the elites aﬀects the citizens' uprising decision indirectly and
may not be suﬃcient to avoid a revolution. The direct switching cost is crucial
in understanding the equilibrium outcome. When this cost is low, a political
regime switching always occurs. The crucial point is then to understand how
the elites optimally adapt to the overthrow of their political power. Contrary
to conventional wisdom, we show that the optimal strategy for the elites is to
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redistribute as many resources as possible to the people in the ﬁrst dictatorial
regime. This result clearly diﬀers from the rapacious resource exploitation em-
phasized by van der Ploeg and Rohner (2012). It highlights the importance of
the ﬁrst striking aspect underlined above, i.e. the timing of events of our rev-
olution game. Once this temporal dimension is taken into account, it comes at
no surprise that making high redistribution levels is worthwhile since it allows
the elites to lengthen the period of political and economic control. When the
direct switching is high, the elites are able to provide suﬃcient transfers to the
opposing citizens and choose the lowest level of redistribution compatible with a
permanent dictatorship. The same kind of results are obtained when the elites
decide to keep the people under control through repressive means. Repression
makes it possible to directly change the switching cost and generally implies that
there is more room for self-preservation. In situations where neither repression
(only) nor redistribution (only) prevent the elites from being removed, a policy-
mix between these two instruments succeeds in maintaining the non-democratic
regime. Based on the criterion of retaining power, there is a temptation to
conclude that this policy-mix is the best strategy for the elites. However, it
is not always true that the payoﬀs associated with an equilibrium featuring a
permanent dictatorship are higher than those corresponding to a solution with
a regime change. Finally, we address the second important point raised in the
beginning of the introduction, which is related to the large variety of outcomes
that has characterized the Arab Spring. A discussion on the determinants of
the cost of revolution (here, switching cost) is conducted. We emphasize how
the results of our theoretical model may contribute to the analysis of the Arab
Spring events by explaining why some countries have experienced a transition to
(more) democratic political regimes while others are still stuck in dictatorships.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the details of our dy-
namic setup. Section 3 then explains the benchmark case when a revolutionary
threat is absent and presents our approach. We formally discuss our political
conﬂict game when the elite adopts a strategy based on concessions for given
DSC in Section 4. Section 5 then analyzes the other polar case where the elite
uses repression in order to keep the citizens under control, and where repression
is the unique determinant of the DSC. Section 6 provides a synthesis of our
analysis by considering the equilibrium under a policy-mix where. Section 7
discusses the implications of our analysis for the Arab spring. Finally, Section
8 concludes.
2 The setup
We consider a modiﬁed AK growth model where the representative agent is
replaced by two inﬁnitely lived groups. We note them as the following players:
the incumbent elite (E) and the opposition (P , for the poor citizens). These
groups comprise a fractionalized society with a resource-dependent economy.
We abstract from any assumption regarding the size of the population and each
rival group. Emulating the framework of Lane and Tornell (1996), let K be the
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stock of resources and A the rate of return on this asset. Resources are deﬁned
in a broad sense and may refer to economic resources, or wealth and windfalls
from natural resources.
There are two political or institutional regimes that describe the ways in
which these groups interact: dictatorship (regime 1) and a freer regime with
common access to the resources (regime 2), the switch from regime 1 to regime
2 being the result of a successful revolution by the citizens. The economy initially
belongs to regime 1. In this regime, the elite has the full control over the econ-
omy and the economic resources and has to divide them between three diﬀerent
uses: self-preservation, consumption, and investment. In order to lengthen the
dictatorial system, the elite may choose either to make concessions to the citi-
zens or to rely on repression. Self-preservation through concessionary spending
takes the form a transfer of a share 1 − uE of the output AK to the opposi-
tion. More formally, the concession strategy of the elite is modeled as a choice
uE ∈ [uE , uE ], where uE , the share of resources accruing to the elite, also repre-
sents the inequality in the access to economic resources. Alternatively or jointly,
the elite may decide to opt for a repression strategy. The repression strategy
consists of a ﬂow of military expenditures rE ∈ [rE , rE ], that can be interpreted
as bribes paid to those who repress (or a periodic ﬁxed cost to pay to beneﬁt
from the protection to get some military support). The two last decisions of the
elite involve the classical consumption-investment intertemporal tradeoﬀ. Let
CE be the elite consumption at period t.
6 Then, the dynamics of the stock of
economic resources are:
K˙ = uEAK − CE − rE , (1)
with K(0) = K0, given.
Citizens' only source of wealth is from the elite's transfers, used for con-
sumption: CP = (1−uE)AK.7 Concessions and repression aﬀect the revolution
strategy of the citizens in two diﬀerent ways. From the expression of the citi-
zens' consumption, one can easily see that concessions indirectly shape citizens'
decisions by modifying the opportunity cost of the revolution. Other things
equal, the higher the transfer (the lower uE), the lower the incentive to revolt.
By contrast, repression directly impinges upon the opposition. It is worth clari-
fying this point by describing the sequence of events leading to a regime change
and its consequences. A switch from regime 1 to regime 2 results from a revo-
lution by the opposition. A revolution (if any) succeeds with probability one.
A revolt is associated with a global cost χ > 0. This is the continuous time
analog of Acemoglu et al. (2012) who assume that a ﬁxed amount of resource
is destroyed when violent uprisings occur:
K(T+) = K(T )− χ, (2)
6When there is no risk of confusion, the time index is omitted.
7Leaving aside self-preservation, regime 1 is the one wherein the elite consumes and invests,
while the opposition only consume. This structure shares similarities with the literature on
the interaction between capitalists and workers (Lancaster, 1973, Hoel, 1978), except that in
our framework citizens are completely passive and subject to the control of the elite.
8
which means that the state variable experiences a downward jump at the right
of the switching time T , provided that T is ﬁnite. T represents the switching
strategy of the citizens.
In addition, when conducting a revolt, the opposition incurs a direct switch-
ing cost (DSC), ψ > 0. This cost may be due to eﬀorts from collective action,
i.e. the opposing citizens need to coordinate when trying to instigate conﬂict.
Nonetheless, the magnitude of the DSC can also be interpreted as a measure
of regime contestability. The higher is this cost, the more diﬃcult it is for the
opposition to lead a popular uprising against the ruling elite. The important
point to note is that repression by the elite makes the cost of revolting rela-
tively higher.8 As explained in the introduction section, the DSC are therefore
partially controllable by the elites through rE . In this paper, we will study
the polar cases where the DSC are fully exogenous (Section 4) vs fully control-
lable (Sections 5 and 6) via rE . Hereafter, we make some assumptions on the
dependence of ψ on rE when it is postulated:
Assumption 1 ψ(rE) from [rE , rE ] to [ψ,ψ], with 0 < ψ < ψ <∞, ψ′(rE) > 0
and ψ′′(rE) ≤ 0.
After a revolution, the system switches to regime 2 where common access to
economic resources prevails. The dynamics of the stock K simply becomes:
K˙ = AK − CE − CP . (3)
Our view is that this second regime is characterized by more (political)
freedom but may not be a well functioning democracy yet. Put diﬀerently,
our groups engage in a political rent-seeking competition: Both groups try to
extract transfers from resource wealth in a non-cooperative manner. The elite is
no longer a leader but survives to the revolution, i.e. continues to take decisions
even after she loses the control of the economy. This assumption diﬀers from
what is usually done in the literature (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). We
do believe however that it is relevant to describe the situations of some Arab
countries where the Arab spring events have been successful in overthrowing the
ruling elite.
The preferences of the two groups are the same and invariant with the regime.
A logarithmic function is utilized, e.g. U(Cji ) = ln(C
j
i ) with i = E,P and
j = 1, 2. The rate of pure time preference is δ and the time horizon is inﬁnite.
In the next section, we ﬁrst present the benchmark situation where the elite
is not subject to the revolution threat. Then, we examine the diﬀerential game
corresponding to the second regime. This preliminary discussion will serve as a
basis for the original part of the paper, devoted to the analysis of the political
regime change game under concessions and repression.
8Alternatively, we may assume that a revolution does not succeed with probability one and
make the probability of success dependent on the level of repression. This would not change
the general message delivered by the subsequent analysis.
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3 Perpetual dictatorship, common pool game
3.1 Perpetual dictatorship of the elite
Our problem may generate two possible political modes: a perpetual dictatorial
regime, and a regime switching from elite rule to common access. It is ﬁrst
worth studying the benchmark case with perpetual dictatorship, i.e. a regime
in which one player (the incumbent elite) has permanent control of the political
system. It boils down to considering that the ruling elite faces no threat of
revolution. For the time being, assume that both uE and rE are given. Then,
the elite solves the following optimization program:
max
{CE}
∫ ∞
0
ln(CE)e
−δtdt
subject to (1) and K(0) = K0 given.
Straightforward manipulation of the necessary optimality conditions yield
the time path of K, CE and CP :
K(t) = (K0 − rEuEA )e(uEA−δ)t + rEuEA
CE(t) = δ
(
K0 − rEuEA
)
e(uEA−δ)t
CP (t) = (1− uE)A
[(
K0 − rEuEA
)
e(uEA−δ)t + rEuEA
] (4)
The resulting present value, for the elite, is given by:
VE(uE , rE) =
1
δ
[
ln(δ) + ln
(
K0 − rE
uEA
)
+
uEA
δ
− 1
]
. (5)
Several remarks can be made. First, the growth rate of the elite's consumption is
equal to g = uEA− δ. Therefore, modifying the sharing rule is accompanied by
a positive growth eﬀect. By increasing uE , the elite has more resources available
for consumption and investment. This stimulates growth. In addition, there is
also a positive scale eﬀect. Given the level of repression, an increase in uE also
implies that the elite has more resources left for consumption. In the absence of
threat of conﬂict, the optimal choice of the elite is to set the sharing rule to the
largest possible value, i.e. to uE . Second, the repression decision only involves
a negative scale eﬀect. So, it is also clear that when the elite does not have any
political challenger, there is no incentive to repress and the optimal repression
level is rE . For simplicity, hereafter, we will take rE = 0. Third, the present
value earned by the citizens, in this case, is:
VP (uE , 0) =
1
δ
[ln((1− uE)A) + ln(K0) + uEA
δ
− 1], (6)
while they also beneﬁt from the growth eﬀect associated with an increase in uE ,
they incur a negative rent capturing eﬀect. Increasing uE means that the elite
grabs more resources at the expense of the opposition.
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Fourth, when a revolutionary threat is present, one logically expects that the
elite will no longer be able to set her instruments to the levels uE and rE = 0.
In the subsequent analysis, we will envision two extreme cases:
•Case 1. Concessions, no repression: In this ﬁrst case, the elite will respond
to the threat of revolution by making concessions only, which allow her to modify
the opportunity cost of revolting for the citizens. Therefore, the strategy will
be to choose uE ∈ [uE , uE ], taking rE = 0.
• Case 2. Repression, no concessions: In contrast, here we consider that
the elite sets the sharing rule to her most preferred level uE and deals with the
threat of revolution through military expenditures. Thus, the choice is to pick
up a rE ∈ [0, rE ].
Let's now discuss the critical boundaries for the domain of deﬁnition of our
strategies, in the two cases. The basic idea we want to convey is that whenever
the elite can maintain the citizens under control by appropriately choosing her
instrument, she should beneﬁt from her resulting leadership. Put diﬀerently, it
seems reasonable to disregard situations where player E controls the economy
and can't take advantage of this power. This would mean that she obtains a
value that is less than the value of player P , who is subject to her domination. In
a permanent dictatorial regime, we rather want to have: VE(uE , 0) ≥ VP (uE , 0)
for all uE ∈ [uE , uE ] (case 1) and VE(uE , rE) ≥ VP (uE , rE) for all rE ∈ [0, rE ]
(case 2).9 This consideration leads us to impose the following restrictions, sum-
marized in two diﬀerent assumptions:
Assumption 2 Under the concession strategy, the lower bound of the domain
of deﬁnition of uE is deﬁned such that VP (uE) = VE(uE)⇔ uE = 1− δA .
Assumption 3 Under the repression strategy, the upper bound of the domain
is deﬁned by: rE =
uEAK0(δ−(1−uE)A)
δ , which implies that VE(rE) > VP (rE) for
all rE ≤ rE.
All the proofs are relegated in the appendices (see Appendix A.1).
In order to simplify the analysis even further we will consider simple once-
and-for-all strategies for concessions and repression. In addition, note that in
both cases, the model exhibits a leader-follower structure regarding decisions uE
and/or rE and T . It thus encompasses a two-stage optimal control/diﬀerential
game problem that has to be solved backward. In the next section, we brieﬂy
examine the game played by our two players following a revolution.
3.2 After the regime switch: common access
After the revolution, the two groups interact in a common-pool resource diﬀer-
ential game. Indeed, regime 2 is characterized by the lack of strong institutions.
It can be seen as reduced form model where each group has its own resource
9To save notations, we will not make the dependance of the value function with respect to
the second ﬁxed instrument explicit. For instance, in the ﬁrst case, we will denote the value
function of player i as Vi(uE), i = E,P .
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stock, with ability to appropriate part of the other's wealth (Lane and Tornell,
1996). Given the structure of the model described above, this game is sym-
metric. Using Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) as the solution concept and
guessing linear (proportional) feedback strategy for players, which implies that
Cj = aj + bjK with aj , bj two constants, each player solves:
max
{Ci}
∫ ∞
T
ln(Ci)e
−δtdt
subject to (3), given K(T+) = K˜ − χ, where K˜ is the level of the capital stock
at the instant of the revolution, and the guess formulated above. Direct manip-
ulations of the necessary optimality conditions yield the MPE (the superscript
2 refers to the second regime){
K2(t) = (K˜ − χ)e(A−2δ)(t−T ),
C2i (t) = δ(K˜ − χ)e(A−2δ)(t−T ),
(7)
and the value corresponding to this problem is, for each player i = E,P :
V 2i (K˜ − χ) =
1
δ
[
ln(δ) + ln(K˜ − χ) + A
δ
− 2
]
.
This value yield the continuation payoﬀ as seen from regime 1.
We conclude this section by discussing growth prospects in the diﬀerent
regimes. A restriction on the parameters is imposed, which is necessary and
suﬃcient to ensure that the regime following a revolution is compatible with
non-negative growth:
Assumption 4 The productivity parameter is high enough compared to the dis-
count rate: A− 2δ ≥ 0.
This assumption is the most relevant in our AK model where the analysis
is conducted in terms of balanced growth path.10 Given the lower bound on
the sharing rule (see Assumption 2), this condition also ensures that elite's
consumption grows at a positive rate in  the non permanent dictatorial 
regime 1, whatever the case under scrutiny.
We are now equipped to analyze the political regime change problem. The
next two sections alternatively conduct the equilibrium analysis in the ﬁrst and
the second case considered. Mixed strategies, involving the simultaneous use of
redistribution and repression, are examined in section 6.
4 Equilibrium under the concession strategy
The purpose of the analysis below is twofold. First, we want to discuss the con-
ditions under which a revolution might occur or, on the contrary the elite might
10Allowing for negative post-revolution growth, as it is observed in Tunisia or Lybia following
the Arab Spring revolutions, would only make sense in the transitional dynamics, i.e. in the
short run, that are absent here.
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stay in power forever. Second in case of unavoidable uprising, we wonder what
is the best concession strategy for the elite. If a revolution takes place in ﬁnite
time, then the optimization problem can be decomposed into two subproblems,
one for each regime. This is solved backward starting from the diﬀerential game
studied above.
4.1 Before the regime switch: Elite rule
Let us proceed with the analysis of the problem faced by the elite given the
potential occurrence of a revolution at some date T . Under the once and for
all choice of the resource sharing by the incumbent elite,11 ﬁrst we solve the
optimal control problem for any uE . Then, we examine the elite's choice of the
sharing rule. The optimization program of the elite is given by:
max
CE
∫ T
0
ln(CE)e
−δtdt+ e−δTV 2E(K˜ − χ)
subject to (1), K(0) = K0, and given that T 5∞. The level K(T ) = K˜ is free
if T <∞.
Simple computations give the general solution, valid in the dictatorial regime,
indexed by 1, for any uE :
K1(t) = φeuEAt + (K0 − φ)e(uEA−δ)t
C1E(t) = δ(K0 − φ)e(uEA−δ)t
C1P (t) = (1− uE)A[φeuEAt + (K0 − φ)e(uEA−δ)t]
(8)
with φ an unknown. If T <∞, then K1(T ) = K˜ is free and the corresponding
transversality condition is:12
e−δTλ1E(T ) = e
−δT ∂V
2
E(.)
∂K
. (10)
The crucial point is that the elite does not directly choose whether T 5∞.
However, in some circumstances, he will be able to inﬂuence the choice of the
citizens to revolt or not. The purpose of the next section is to discuss the
condition(s) under which either a solution with T <∞, or T =∞ exists.
11To keep the forthcoming solutions tractable, we assume that there is no hold-up problem.
The commitment mechanism of the elite is credible.
12Otherwise (T =∞), we have the usual standard transversality condition (and we get back
to the permanent dictatorship studied in section 3.1):
lim
t→∞ e
−δtλ1E(t)K
1(t) = 0. (9)
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4.2 Timing of the revolt
If the opposition ﬁnds it optimal to challenge political control by the elite, then
he earns the following present value:13
VP (K0, T ) =
∫ T
0
ln(C1P )e
−δtdt+ e−δT [V 2P (K˜ − χ)− ψ]. (11)
The optimal condition for switching results from the maximization of (11) w.r.t
T , which yields:
ln(C1P (T ))− V 2P (K˜ − χ) = −δψ.
If there exists an optimal T for switching then the marginal beneﬁt from delaying
the switch (LHS) must be equal to the marginal direct switching cost at this
instant (RHS). Using (2) and (8), this condition can be rewritten as:
ln
(
K˜
K˜ − χ
)
=
A
δ
− 2 + ln
(
δ
[1− uE ]A
)
− δψ. (12)
The LHS is a measure of the extent of the switching cost. The ﬁrst term in
the RHS represents the growth rate achieved under the second regime. The
second term is a ratio of the proportion of resource consumed by the citizens in
the second and ﬁrst regimes. The last entity represents the discounted private
switching cost. Denote the RHS of (12) as ω(uE) and deﬁne the critical threshold
for the DSC, ψ˜u, as follows:
ψ˜u =
1
δ
(
A
δ
− 2) (13)
Then, it can be established that:
Lemma 1 A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of a solution
to (12) is: ω(uE) > 0.
1. If ψ < ψ˜u (low DSC) then, ω(uE) > 0 for all uE ∈ [uE , uE ]: There
always exists a unique K˜(uE) for switching with,
K˜(uE) =
χeω(uE)
eω(uE) − 1 . (14)
2. Else, ψ ≥ ψ˜u (high DSC), there exists a critical threshold u˜E such that
ω(uE) > 0⇔ uE > u˜E with,
u˜E = 1− δ
A
eδ(ψ˜u−ψ), (15)
this threshold is admissible i.e. u˜E > uE.
13Under the concession strategy, the DSC is equal to the lowest possible value ψ, i.e. the
elite can't change the DSC directly.
14
Irrespective of the size of the global switching cost (GSC), χ, the occurrence
of a political regime change is more likely when the DSC is low enough. For
a high enough DSC, the decision to undertake a revolution will be bound to
the sharing of resource ﬁxed by the elite. So, the actual DSC and its posi-
tion compared to the threshold ψ˜u is of crucial importance to understand the
options available to the elite. Clearly, when the DSC is low, the elite can't
avoid the revolution through concessions and the question is what is her best
strategy given that the regime change is inevitable. By contrast, when the cost
of switching regime is high enough, the elite seems to have the choice between
making sizeable concessions in order to stay in power forever or grabbing a lot
of economic resources in the ﬁrst regime till a switch to regime 2 occurs.
Based on this discussion, hereafter a distinction will be made between two
scenarios, depending on the magnitude of the opposing citizens' switching cost.
4.3 Magnitude of the switching costs and nature of the
equilibrium
4.3.1 Low DSC scenario
In the case where the DSC of the citizens is low, ψ < ψ˜u, a series of questions
naturally arise: Does a solution with a revolution always exist? What does
the incumbent do in its anticipation of a future regime change? Despite the
existence of an interior solution, is the alternative (permanent elite dictatorship)
still possible?
Part of the answer to the ﬁrst question is provided by the proposition below
where we characterize, for uE given, the solution to the switching problem.
Proposition 1 The optimal switching time is implicitly given by
K0e
(uEaA−δ)T = χ
(
1
eω(uEa) − 1 + e
−δT
)
. (16)
This equation has a unique solution, denoted by T (uE), if and only if
K˜(uE) > K0 ⇔ χe
ω(uE)
eω(uE) − 1 > K0. (17)
where K˜(uE) is deﬁned in (14).
If K˜(u¯E) > K0, and furthermore χ > K0, then this solution exists for all
uE ∈ [uE , uE ].
Proof. See the Appendix A.2.
Proposition 1 states that the switching level must be higher than the initial
stock. This implies that the opposition allows the resource to accumulate ﬁrst.
This ensures that the remaining cake after the switch is high enough to com-
pensate for the loss incurred during the regime change. This also guarantees
that what is competed for in the common access regime is abundant. More
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importantly, Proposition 1 indicates that the existence condition is dependent
on the GSC. The existence of a solution, for a given uE , surprisingly requires
the GSC be high compared to the initial stock, K0. The cost of switching for
society must be high enough for the citizens to revolt against the elite. Indeed,
the explanation relies on a remaining cake size eﬀect. In order for the second
regime to be valuable to the citizens, the amount of resource available at the
beginning of the common pool game should be suﬃciently high. In other words,
the remaining cake K˜(uE) − χ should be large enough for the revolution to
occur. Now, this critical level is increasing in χ.
Assuming that a regime change will occur in ﬁnite time, we now tackle the
choice of the sharing rule by the elite. Before proceeding to the analysis, it is
useful to assess the features of the solution in regime 1:
K1(t) = χeuEA(t−T )
(
1 + e
−δ(t−T )
eω(uE)−1
)
,
C1E(t) =
δχ
eω(uE)−1e
(uEA−δ)(t−T ),
C1P (t) = (1− uE)AK1(t).
(18)
Let us start the discussion with a comparative statics exercise. From (14)
and (16), it appears that:{
∂K˜
∂uE
< 0; ∂K˜∂χ > 0;
∂K˜
∂ψ > 0;
∂T
∂uE
< 0; ∂T∂K0 < 0;
∂T
∂χ > 0;
∂T
∂ψ > 0.
As expected the desired switching level, for the citizens, is decreasing in uE :
The higher uE , the lower the opportunity cost of switching. A high uE implies
that the ﬁrst regime is painful for the citizens. In contrast, the higher the GSC
or the DSC, the higher the desired switching level of resource. This is due to the
cake size eﬀect. Regarding the switching date, the revolution will occur more
rapidly if the elite chooses an unequal sharing rule during the ﬁrst regime. The
switching date decreases with the initial endowment too. The more abundant
is the initial stock of natural resource in the economy, the more rapidly will
conﬂict occur. With a higher initial stock, the resource level that triggers the
revolt is achieved earlier. This observation is consistent with resource curse
literature related to civil wars (see Hodler, 2006; Ploeg and Rohner, 2012 for
detailed examples). Finally, the impact of a change in the switching costs on
T is positive. To make the revolt valuable, the citizens must accept a longer
phase of resource accumulation during the ﬁrst regime in order to reach a larger
K˜(uE) that will compensate for the cost.
Also central to the elite decision is the impact of a change in uE on her
consumption level during the ﬁrst regime.14 The elite's consumption can be
14Another interesting feature of the ﬁrst regime concerns the evolution of the ratio between
the consumption levels of the two groups, which can be seen as a measure of the level of
inequalities in the society. From (18), it appears that the ratio
C1P (t)
C1
E
(t)
=
(1−uE)A
δ
[1+(eω(uE)−
1)eδ(t−T )] increases over time. As time passes by, the diﬀerence between consumption levels
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rewritten as:
C1E(t;uE) = δKˆ0(uE)e
(uEA−δ)t with Kˆ0(uE) = K0 − χe−uEAT (uE) (19)
Comparing this expression with the one in (4), with rE = 0, it turns out that the
growth rate of consumption is similar. The striking diﬀerence is the existence
of a scale eﬀect. Elite consumption is lower at the equilibrium with a regime
change, uE being given. The derivative of elite consumption with respect to uE
is
∂C1E(t;uE)
∂uE
= δ
[
Kˆ ′0(uE) +AtKˆ0(uE)
]
e(uEA−δ)t, (20)
with,
Kˆ ′0(uE) = χAT (uE)e
−uEAT (uE)[1 + σ(T )],
where σ(T ) = uET
′(uE)
T (uE)
is the elasticity of the switching date with respect to
the sharing rule uE .
The RHS of (20) can be decomposed into two terms. The second term is a
positive growth eﬀect. A larger uE implies greater investment. This eventually
translates into a higher consumption growth rate. The ﬁrst term is a combi-
nation of two opposing forces: the wealth eﬀect due to rent-capturing, and the
regime instability eﬀect. When uE increases, indeed, the elite is able to consume
more. However, increasing uE always decreases the waiting time T (uE) when a
revolution will occur. A higher uE makes elite rule less cohesive.
If |σ(T )| ≤ 1, the wealth eﬀect dominates the instability eﬀect. Consumption
in the ﬁrst regime increases with uE . On the other hand, if the impact of uE
on T is strong enough (|σ(T )| > 1), then the instability eﬀect dominates. In
this case, when investment uE increases, elite consumption takes the opposite
direction. In anticipation of conﬂict, the elite is willing to sacriﬁce her own
consumption. From now on, we assume |σ(T )| ≤ 1, i.e. the switching time
chosen by the citizens is not too sensitive to the sharing rule. This is a relevant
characteristic of resource-dependent economies with mediocre levels of social
capital, e.g. awareness towards collective action.
Let us now look at the incumbent elite's choice of uE , under the constraint
that uE ∈ [uE , uE ]. The value obtained by the elite in the equilibrium with an
interior regime switching is:
VE(uE) =
∫ T (uE)
0
ln[C1E(t;uE)]e
−δtdt+ e−δT (uE)V 2E [K˜(uE)− χ]. (21)
decreases. However, the consumption level of the elite at any date up to T is larger than the
one of the citizens because C1E(T ) > C
1
P (T ). This feature may appear to be at odd compared
to what is observed in reality. It however reﬂects the optimal reaction of the elite to the
future occurrence of a political regime change. In anticipation to the coming events, the elite
optimally decides to smooth her consumption during the transition between the two regimes.
This is ultimately accompanied by a decrease of the consumption ratio. Note however that
what may seem to be a drawback of our stylized model is not robust to the removal of the
normalization of the lower bound on the repression strategy to nought. With a strictly positive
rE , this by-product of the analysis will not be observed.
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The derivative of VE w.r.t. uE is:
∂VE(uE)
∂uE
=

∫ T (uE)
0
∂C1E(t;uE)
∂uE
C1E(t;uE)
e−δtdt
+T ′(uE)e−δT (uE){ln[C1E(T (uE))]− δV 2E [K˜(uE)− χ]}
+e−δT (uE) ∂V
2
E [K˜(uE)−χ]
∂K K˜
′(uE)
(22)
The ﬁrst term represents the cumulative impact of a change in the redis-
tribution rate on consumption. As shown above, this is positive as long as
|σ(T )| ≤ 1. The second positive term states a comparison between the cost and
beneﬁt at the switching time T (uE). The term between the brace brackets is
the marginal gain of delaying the switch. It is weighted by the derivate of the
switching date w.r.t uE , which is negative. It compares the discounted value of
what the elite gains in the second regime, and her loss in utility (from consump-
tion) during the switch. The third term exhibits the remaining cake size eﬀect.
This is always negative as K˜ ′(uE). Simply put, this term indicates the loss due
to resource destruction at the start of the second regime.15 Careful analysis of
this derivative leads to:
Proposition 2 If |σ(T )| ≤ 1 for all uE ∈ [uE , uE ], then under the conditions
of Proposition 1, there exists an equilibrium with political regime switching in
ﬁnite time in which the elite sets the sharing of resource to the level u∗E = uE.
Proof. See the Appendix A.3.
Given that a revolt will occur in the future, one may expect that the elite's
best response is to set the sharing rule to the highest possible value uE as she
takes advantage of her period of control. This is the kind of message delivered
by the related literature (see for instance Ploeg and Rohner, 2012). It turns out
that the optimal choice of the elite is the exact opposite, i.e. she chooses an
uE equal to the lower bound uE . This quite surprising result emphasizes the
role of the timing, which is typically ignored by the literature. However, once
we account for the timing issue, it comes at no surprise that setting uE is good
to the elite. It allows her to delay the regime switching and to lengthen the
duration in oﬃce.
The last question is whether there exist multiple equilibria in the low DSC
scenario. The other possible solution corresponds to the situation where the
opposing citizens never ﬁnd it optimal to undertake a revolt. This means that
we have a corner solution for the regime switching problem. Assuming that the
initial regime is dictatorship and immediate switching is not allowed, the corner
solution of interest is of the never switching type. If there is no T < ∞ for
15An alternative reading of the expression in (22) is that the impact of a change in uE
can be divided between three diﬀerent eﬀects, depending on the period during! which the
change is felt: The marginal impact of choosing uE before the regime change (ﬁrst term), the
marginal impact at this instant of the regime change (second term) and the marginal impact
of varying uE after the political switch (last term).
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switching, then it must hold that:
lim
T→∞
∂VP (.)
∂T
≥ 0⇔ lim
T→∞
e−δT
[
ln
(
K˜
K˜ − χ
)
− ω(uE)
]
≥ 0 (23)
with VP (.) deﬁned in (11). This condition implies that postponing the switch
is associated with a marginal gain that is not lower than the marginal loss of
foregoing for an instant the beneﬁt from switching to the second regime.
Given that a general solution with perpetual elite dictatorship is character-
ized by (4), we have:
Proposition 3 For a given uE, a necessary condition for the citizens' problem
to have a never switching solution is ω(uE) ≤ 0. A suﬃcient condition for the
converse to be true is ω(uE) > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix A.4.
To sum up, the analysis conducted in the ﬁrst scenario can be summarized
in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 In the low DSC scenario, there exists a unique equilibrium where
the citizens challenge political control by the elite in ﬁnite time and the elite sets
the sharing rule to the lower bound uE.
According to Lemma 1, in the low DSC scenario, ω(uE) > 0 for all admissible
uE . Despite her leadership and ability to manipulate the sharing rule, the
incumbent elite is unable to avoid the revolution by the opposition.
4.3.2 High DSC scenario
We now pay attention to the second scenario characterized by a high DSC,
ψ ≥ ψ˜u. This is an interesting case because the elite now has the capacity to
indirectly inﬂuence the choice of the citizens. When the elite is willing to make
suﬃcient concessions by sharing the resource in such a way that citizens are
not too harmed, then the latter may not instigate conﬂict. Hence, there might
be conditions wherein the opposition prefer staying under permanent elite rule.
In what follows, we conduct the analysis of the high DSC scenario using the
material presented in the previous subsection.
As stated in Lemma 1, when the DSC is high (and such that ω(uE) < 0), the
elite has two options available. Either, she chooses a sharing rule uE ∈ [uE , u˜E ],
which implies that ω(uE) ≤ 0. In this case, from Lemma 1 and Proposition 3,
the unique equilibrium must be of the never switching type. Or, the elite can ﬁx
the sharing rule to a level uE ∈ (u˜E , uE ]. In this case, the equilibrium candidate
exhibits a regime change, characterized in Lemma 1 Proposition 1.
Nonetheless, even if there are two possible solutions, we cannot have multiple
equilibria, i.e. one equilibrium of each type for the same uE . In the end, the
elite seems to have the power to select the particular outcome that is best for
her. The reason is that in this second scenario, he can strategically aﬀect the
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switching decision of the opposition. Consequently, the elite has a choice to
make between these two options. Obviously, she will select the option yielding
the highest value.
To better understand this decision, we further examine the optimal sharing
rule corresponding to each of these options. In the ﬁrst - never switching -
case, based on the ﬁndings for a perpetual dictatorship with no revolutionary
option (see Section 3.1), the elite should choose u∗E = u˜E : Her value, deﬁned in
(5), with rE put equal to zero, is increasing in uE , which implies that she sets
the sharing rule to the highest level compatible with a permanent dictatorship.
The conditions are rather diﬀerent under the second option as it now considers a
revolt by the citizens. The elite must decide on the sharing rule in (u˜E , uE ] with
the aim of maximizing her value, which is now given by (21). If we want to be
consistent with the condition imposed in Proposition 2 (regarding the elasticity
of the switching date with respect to uE), then the answer is trivial. Given that
the value of the elite is decreasing in uE , her optimal decision would be to set
uE to the lowest possible level. However, this critical redistribution rate, u˜E , is
not achievable because the interval corresponding to a solution with a regime
change is open on the left. Since there is no solution to the elite's problem,
there is no equilibrium featuring a transition between the two political regimes.
This analysis is summarized in:
Corollary 2 In the high DSC scenario, there exists a unique equilibrium where
the elite stays in power forever and sets the sharing rule to the intermediate
level u˜E, deﬁned in (15).
5 Equilibrium under the repression strategy
The analysis of the second case where the elite adopts the repression strategy
for given redistribution is similar to the one conducted in Section 4. We shall
therefore brieﬂy summarize our main ﬁndings. Suppose that the share uE is
ﬁxed at the largest possible value, uE .
From the resolution of the timing problem of the citizens and the deﬁnition
of:
ω(rE) =
A
δ
− 2 + ln
(
δ
[1− uE ]A
)
− δψ(rE),
and,
ψ˜r =
1
δ
(
ln(δ)− ln[(1− uE)A] + A
δ
− 2
)
,
the second critical threshold for the DSC in this case,16 we obtain
Lemma 2 A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of a solution
to the switching problem of the citizens is: ω(rE) > 0.
16Quite naturally we have ψ˜r > ψ˜u: Other things equal, when the elite doesn't provide any
transfers to the citizens, the latter group is willing to revolt for a relatively lower switching
cost. The main diﬀerence with the ﬁrst case is that now the elite is able to modify directly
this switching cost.
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1. If ψ ≥ ψ˜r then dictatorship is necessarily permanent.
2. If ψ < ψ˜r (low returns to repression, RR) then the revolution is
unavoidable and occurs for a switching level K˜(rE) =
χeω(rE)
eω(rE)−1 .
3. If ψ ≥ ψ˜r > ψ (high RR) then there exists a critical repression level
r˜E = ψ
−1(ψ˜r) such that: Any rE < r˜E will trigger a revolution in ﬁnite
time whereas choosing rE ≥ r˜E is a means to avoid the revolution.
Proof. See the appendix A.5.
The solution to the ﬁrst case is trivial. From the discussion conducted in
Section 3.1, the optimal solution is r∗E = 0. By analogy with Section 4, two
interesting cases remain. On the one hand, when the RR are low, the elite is
not able to keep the citizens under control and the political regime change is
inevitable. On the other, the elite may avoid the revolution provided that the
repression technology is eﬃcient enough and by investing at least r˜E in military
expenditures. Put diﬀerently, a permanent policy that consists in devoting a
constant level of resources r˜E to the military budget protects the elite from an
uprising of the citizens.
Next, we can establish that:
Proposition 4 Suppose rE is given. If χ > K0 then the switching time T (rE)
is uniquely and implicitly deﬁned by:(
K0 − rE
uEA
)
e(uEA−δ)T = K˜(rE)− χ+
(
χ− rE
uEA
)
e−δT ,
with K˜(rE) deﬁned in Lemma 2. The comparative statics are:
∂T
∂rE
> 0,
∂K˜
∂rE
> 0;
∂T
∂uE
< 0,
∂K˜
∂uE
< 0;
∂T
∂χ
> 0,
∂K˜
∂χ
> 0 and
∂T
∂K0
< 0.
Proof. See the Appendix A.5.
The same condition as in Proposition 1, for the concession strategy, is also
suﬃcient for the existence of a solution to the switching problem. As far as
the impact of repression on this solution is concerned, intuitively we obtain that
increasing repression expenditures is a means to delay the revolution, which will
occur for a larger stock of resource. Indeed, the larger rE , the higher the cost
of switching and the larger the compensation must be for the citizens. This
compensation takes the form of the achievement of the second regime, whose
proﬁtability is determined by the diﬀerence K˜(rE) − χ (the remaining cake
size). Regarding the other parameters, the larger uE , i.e. the more unequal the
country is in the absence of concessions by the elite, the lower the opportunity
cost of switching and the sooner the political regime change. In addition, with
a large uE , the citizens accept to start the second regime with a lower amount
of economic resources. Finally, a larger initial wealth of stock of resources tends
to expedite the decision to revolt.
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Suppose that T (rE) exists. Then, the solution corresponding to regime 1
can be written as:
K1(t; rE) =
(
χ− rEuEA
)
euEA(t−T (rE)) + (K˜(rE)− χ)e(uEA−δ)(t−T (rE)) + rEuEA
C1E(t; rE) = δ(K˜(rE)− χ)e(uEA−δ)(t−T (rE))
C1P (t; rE) = (1− uE)AK1(t; rE).
(24)
The last proposition summarizes our results in the two possible scenarios,
low vs. high RR. Let us ﬁrst deﬁne σ(K˜) = rEK˜
′(rE)
K˜(rE)
> 0. Then,
Proposition 5 If σ(K˜) < − rEψ′′(rE)ψ′(rE) for all rE ∈ [0, rE ] and
∂C1E(t;rE)
∂rE
|rE=rE >
0 then, ∂VE(rE)∂rE > 0 for all admissible rE.
• In the low RR scenario, there is a unique equilibrium where the revolution
occurs in ﬁnite time and the elite sets r∗E = rE.
• In the high RR scenario, the unique equilibrium features permanent dic-
tatorship and r∗E = r˜E.
Proof. See the Appendix A.5.
Under the repression strategy, the trick consists once again in determining
the sign of the derivative of the value function of the elite with respect to the
rE . This boils down to determining how the consumption of the elite, in the
ﬁrst regime, responds to a change in the repression level. It appears that an
increase in rE has two opposing (scale) eﬀects on the elite consumption. The
eﬀects are more easily seen when rewriting consumption as:
C1E(t; rE) = δ
[
K0 − rE
uEA
−
(
χ− rE
uEA
)
e−uEAT (rE)
]
e(uEA−δ)t
Both the initial condition and the GSC are reduced by an amount rEuEA . The
resulting diﬀerences deﬁne the true values, or the values that matter to the elite
when deciding how much to repress. Then, the analysis runs as follows. As in
the ﬁrst case (concession strategy, see (19)). The constant term in the expres-
sion above is a rescaling of the true initial condition obtained by subtracting
the true GSC incurred at the date of the revolution, T (rE), discounted from the
initial period at the autonomous growth rate of the stock of economic resources.
Other things equal, more repression means that revolution will occur later and
consequently this loss is felt less acutely, which stimulates consumption. How-
ever, at the same time, an increase in rE implies that less resources are left for
consumption and investment at every date in regime 1. This in turn tends to
lower the elite consumption. Now, it turns out that if the elasticity of the desired
switching level, K˜(rE), with respect to repression is low enough and lower than
the sensitivity of the marginal switching with respect to this strategy, then the
overall eﬀect is positive: regime 1 consumption is higher the larger rE .
17 Under
17The second suﬃcient condition is Proposition 5 is a technical boundary condition, see the
Appendix A.5.
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this condition we ﬁnally obtain that the value function of the elite is strictly
increasing in rE when the political regime switch is inevitable. Therefore, in
the low RR scenario, the elite will choose the highest level of repression in order
to lengthen the ﬁrst dictatorial regime. By contrast, when the RR are high, a
permanent dictatorship is the only possible equilibrium. In this case, and given
that her present value is now decreasing with the level of repression, the elite
sets the repression level to the lowest possible value, r˜E , allowing for the absence
of regime switch.
6 Policy mix
In the two preceding sections, the analysis has revealed under which conditions
a revolution might occur in an economy ruled by an elite having two options to
control the citizens. Let us now go back to the other important question raised
by the paper: What is the best strategy for the elite? The answer to this ques-
tion is more complicated. At ﬁrst glance, one may reply that the best strategy
is the one that allows the elite to stay in power forever, if possible. A quick in-
spection of the ordering between the critical switching costs gives some insights
into this crucial point. Assume that ψ < ψ˜u(< ψ˜r). In this situation, adopt-
ing the concession strategy doesn't succeed in avoiding the revolution whereas
repression may be suﬃcient to keep the citizens under control provided that it
renders the switching cost prohibitive, which requires ψ˜r ≤ ψ. Thus based on
this criterion, the elite should implement a repression policy. The conclusion is
reversed however, when the ordering is ψ˜u ≤ ψ < ψ < ψ˜r. Here repression is
not eﬃcient enough to prevent political challenge by the citizens. In this case,
an elite mostly interested in holding power should rather provide citizens with
large transfers so that regime 1 is good enough to them and the opportunity
cost of revolting is too high compared to the resulting beneﬁts associated with
a freer political system.
A last question arises ultimately: could a strategy mix perform better than
the single-instrument strategies studied so far? The answer to this question is
far nontrivial. Let us see under which conditions the strategy mix is better for
the elite in the sense that it allows him to stay in power when a single strategy
fails to do so.
From lemmas 1 and 2, we know that the revolution is unavoidable under
concession (resp. repression) when ψ < ψ˜u (resp. ψ < ψ˜r). Let's assume that
these two conditions hold and the overall ordering is: ψ < ψ˜u < ψ < ψ˜r.
18 In
that case, using a strategy mix can be a means to maintain the dictatorship.
The proof is as follows: From now on, we allow rE and uE to vary in their
respective domains of deﬁnition, i.e. [0, rE ] and [uE , uE ]. Adopting the same
methodology as before, we can show that the switching problem of the citizens
18The following reasoning can easily be extended to the other possible cases.
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deﬁnes a unique K˜(rE , uE) if and only if ω(rE , uE) > 0 with:
ω(rE , uE) =
A
δ
− 2 + ln
(
δ
[1− uE ]A
)
− δψ(rE).
Solving the equation ω(rE , uE) = 0 boils down to solving ψ(rE) = ϕ(uE). The
function ϕ(uE) = ψ˜r − 1δ [ln(1 − uE) − ln(1 − uE)](> 0 for uE ≥ uE) satisﬁes
ϕ′(uE) > 0, ϕ(uE) = ψ˜u and ϕ(uE) = ψ˜r. Given our ordering, it's clear that
ψ(rE) = ϕ(uE) has a solution because we have ψ < ϕ(uE) < ψ < ϕ(uE). More
precisely, we can deﬁne uˆE ∈ (uE , uE) such that ϕ(uˆE) = ψ and rˆE ∈ (0, rE)
such that ψ(rˆE) = ψ˜u. Given that ψ is invertible, for any uE ∈ [uE , uˆE ],
the equation ψ(rE) = ϕ(uE) can rewritten as a relationship rE = κ(uE)(=
ψ−1′(ϕ(uE))) with κ′(uE) > 0, κ(uE) = rˆE and κ(uˆE) = rE . By deﬁnition,
any pair (rE , uE) belonging to this locus is such that ω(rE , uE) = 0. Then, let
ζ be the set such that for any pair taken in this set a revolution cannot occur
(dictatorship is permanent) because ω(rE , uE) ≤ 0:
ζ = {(rE , uE) ∈ [uE , uˆE ]× [rˆE , rE ]/rE ≥ κ(uE)} ,
the complementary set being denoted by ζ. For any pair in ζ, there might exist
an equilibrium with a revolution in ﬁnite time.
The second step consists in determining the optimal combination (rE , uE) ∈
ζ. Under permanent dictatorship, the value of the elite is given by (5), which
is decreasing in rE and increasing in uE . Thus, for any, uE , the elite chooses
the lowest level of repression compatible with dictatorship. This means that the
optimal combination necessarily lies in the frontier given by rE = κ(uE). Then,
the value can be rewritten as:
VE(uE , κ(uE)) =
1
δ
[
ln(δ) + ln
(
K0 − κ(uE)
uEA
)
+
uEA
δ
− 1
]
.
Taking the derivative w.r.t uE , one obtains:
∂VE
∂uE
=
κ(uE)
u2EA(K0 − κ(uE)uEA )
(1− σ(κ)) + A
δ2
with σ(κ) =
uEκ
′(uE)
κ(uE)
,
and the condition σ(κ) < 1, together with K0 − κ(uE)uEA > 0, is suﬃcient to have
∂VE
∂uE
> 0. The conclusion is that the optimal combination is (uˆE , rE), which
yields a present value:
V PE (uˆE , rE) =
1
δ
[
ln(δ) + ln
(
K0 − rE
uˆEA
)
+
uˆEA
δ
− 1
]
. (25)
The third step shows that permanent dictatorship is indeed the unique equi-
librium when the ordering is ψ < ψ˜u < ψ < ψ˜r. Here our aim is to generalize
the analyses of the previous sections and to prove that under the conditions
used in propositions 1 and 5, very few is needed to obtain the result.
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Let's assume that the elite picks up a policy mix from ζ. This implies that
the switching problem has a solution (K˜(rE , uE), T (rE , uE)), which is similar to
the one characterized in lemma 2, proposition 4 and (24) when one replaces uE
with any uE provided that (rE , uE) ∈ ζ.19 To determine under which conditions
the general properties derived in the two preceding sections are still valid, let's
see how the ﬁrst period elite's consumption, C1E(t; rE , uE) responds to changes
in rE and uE given that:
C1E(t; rE , uE) = δ(K˜(rE , uE)− χ)e(uEA−δ)(t−T (rE ,uE)),
with K˜(rE) =
χeω(rE,uE)
eω(rE,uE)−1 .
Partial derivative w.r.t rE for any uE ∈ [uE , uˆE ]:20
∂C1E(t; rE , uE)
∂rE
= C1E(t; rE , uE)
(
K˜rE
K˜(rE , uE)− χ
− (uEA− δ)TrE
)
,
We know that under the conditions of Proposition 5, this derivative is positive
at uE = uE . Given that
K˜rE
K˜(rE ,uE)−χ =
δψ′(rE)K˜(rE ,uE)
χ is decreasing in uE
(because K˜uE < 0), we have
K˜rE
K˜(rE ,uE)−χ |uE≤uˆE >
K˜rE
K˜(rE ,uE)−χ |uE=uE . Note also
that uEA − δ < uEA − δ for all uE ∈ [uE , uˆE ]. Then the condition TrEuE > 0
for all (rE , uE) ∈ ζ is suﬃcient to conclude that ∂C
1
E(t;rE ,uE)
∂rE
> 0 provided
that the conditions of Proposition 5, adapted to the case studied, hold. The
ﬁrst condition is σ(K˜) < − rEψ′′(rE)ψ′(rE) where the RHS is independent of uE and
one can easily check that the LHS is decreasing in uE . Thus, this condition
must be strengthened to require that σ(K˜)|uE=uE < − rEψ
′′(rE)
ψ′(rE)
. The second
technical condition is satisﬁed as well. The new condition, that involves the
cross derivative TrEuE > 0, basically means that when the elite makes less
concessions (uE increases), the switching time chosen by the citizens becomes
more sensitive to the level of repression.
By analogy with section 4, consumption can be rewritten as: C1E(t;uE , rE) =
δKˆ0(uE , rE)e
(uEA−δ)t with
Kˆ0(uE , rE) = K0 − rE
AuE
− (χ− rE
AuE
)e−uEAT (uE ,rE).
The partial derivative w.r.t uE for any rE ∈ [rˆE , rE ]:
∂C1E(t;uE)
∂uE
= δ
[
Kˆ0,uE +AtKˆ0(uE)
]
e(uEA−δ)t,
with,
Kˆ0,uE =
rE
Au2E
(
1− e−uEAT (rE ,uE)
)
+
(
χ− rE
uEA
)
AT (rE , uE)(1 + σ(T )),
19Of course, the argument uE becomes apparent in the functions K˜(.) and T (.).
20With a slight abuse of notation, we will denote the derivate w.r.t rE for K˜ and T as K˜rE
and TrE .
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where σ(T ) =
uETuE
T (rE ,uE)
is increasing in rE . Then, extending the condition of
Proposition 2 to |σ(T )|rE=rE ≤ 1 is suﬃcient to conclude that ∂C
1
E(t;uE)
∂uE
> 0.
Finally, under the conditions stated above, it's straightforward to show that
the present value of the elite at a solution featuring a regime change is decreasing
in uE and increasing in rE . Thus, there is no equilibrium with a political regime
switching because one cannot ﬁnd a pair (rE , uE) that maximizes the elite value.
For instance, the elite would like to choose the highest concession level uE but
then it doesn't exist a repression level such that the pair of instruments belongs
to ζ. In sum, when the ordering is ψ < ψ˜u < ψ < ψ˜r, there exists a unique
equilibrium with permanent dictatorship, which produces a payoﬀ equal to (25).
In concluding this discussion, we want to emphasize a crucial point. At
the beginning of this section we argued that a success in keeping the political
control is a good criterion to evaluate the best strategy. However, this criterion
may not be so clear and forceful. Indeed, it may well be that the elite, by
using an instrument only and accepting the regime change, is better oﬀ than
by implementing a policy mix of the type discussed above. Put diﬀerently, the
present value associated with the former strategy may likely be higher than the
one yielded by the latter. Therefore, according to the criterion of (maximizing)
the present value, accepting the revolution and adapting to this event may
constitute the optimal strategy of the elite. Unfortunately, any attempt to go
deeper into this discussion is vain. The comparison between the values provided
by the diﬀerent strategies appears to be a diﬃcult exercise and doesn't allow us
to identify the set of conditions under which this provocative result holds.21 As
an illustration of the various conﬂicting (growth and scale) eﬀects at stake, let's
have a quick look at the comparison between the concession strategy and the
policy mix. In this particular case, it can easily be shown that growth prospects
are higher at the policy mix solution. But, how the scale eﬀect exactly play
is unclear. If the elite redistributes much more resources at the solution with
concession, she doesn't spend a penny to repress the citizens whereas, with the
policy mix, she devotes a lot of resources to her military budget. In general,
it is possible neither to know which solution the scale eﬀect beneﬁt to, nor
to conclude which eﬀect prevails (when the scale eﬀect pushes in the opposite
direction as the growth eﬀect).
21From the results of sections 4 and 5, we know that the degenerated combination of instru-
ments corresponding to these two cases are respectively given by (0, uE) (concessions) and
(rE , uE) (repression). The values produced by these extreme strategies are:
V CE (0, uE) =
1
δ
(
ln(δ) + ln(K˜(0, uE)− χ)− (uEA− δ)T (0, uE) + uEA−δδ
)
,
V RE (rE , uE) =
1
δ
[
e−δT (rE ,uE)
(
A(1−uE)−δ
δ
)
+ ln(δ) + ln(K˜(rE , uE)− χ)− (uEA− δ)T (rE , uE) + uEA−δδ
]
,
and one cannot ﬁnd simple conditions to ﬁnd the ordering between these values and the one
produced by the policy mix (25).
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7 Implications for the Arab spring
As mentioned in the introduction, the DSC are neither fully controllable as in
Sections 5 and 6 nor totally exogenous as in Section 4. Recall that the DSC
reﬂect either the cost of a collective action (or the cost of coordination) or the
extent to which the regime set by the elites is contestable, that's in particular
the extent of their repressive forces. Because the DSC are aﬀected in real life
by such diverse factors as national demography, international geopolitics and
connectability of the countries to global markets and media, our theoretical
analysis (of the polar cases) need to be qualiﬁed. A few points are worth to
make in the Arab spring context.
a) A major ﬁnding of the theoretical analysis is that the equilibrium essen-
tially depends on the level of the DSC. An interesting example is Bahrein.
Since his arrival in oﬃce in 1999, Sheikh Hamad has started a sequence
of democratization and political liberalization steps leading many inter-
national organizations to believe that the country has deﬁnitely improved
regarding protection of human rights. This low level of repression was
however associated with what the religious majority of the country (the
Shias) felt as an unfair redistribution of resources. In this context, our the-
ory would predict a revolution and a regime change at ﬁnite time (Section
4). Indeed, the Shias revolt took place in 2011 but the massive external
intervention of Saudi Arabia to back the Khalifa dynasty changed the out-
come. A large enough exogenous increase in the DSC through external
intervention as in Bahrein would change the equilibrium to permanent
dictatorship.22 We might also interpret the Libyan case symmetrically:
Initially repression was strong in this country (and so was the military
threat of the former dictator) and redistribution quite sizeable, leading to
permanent dictatorship according to our theory if no external intervention
occurs. The NATO bombings implied a rapid drop in the DSC faced by
the opposition, opening the doors wide open for an alternative equilibrium
with a revolution and regime change at ﬁnite time.
b) As referred to in the introduction, as the DSC can also be interpreted
as coordinations costs, it might help explaining the role of human capital
level in the genesis of the Arab spring. In particular, if one admits that the
larger the education level, the lower the coordination costs in collective
actions (so the lower the DSC), the Tunisian lead sounds more natural
given the weight of public education in the budget of this country and
the impressive literacy performances registered in the relevant population
age classes.23 While this single criterion cannot explain the whole picture,
it is a relevant part of the story. The institutional stability of the Gulf
22In a straightforward extension of our model with random revolution success such as the
probability of success is a decreasing function of total repression forces, we would get that the
Shias would have not revolted if they would have anticipated the Saudi intervention.
23According to the World Bank Edstats, the literacy rate in the 15-24 years old population
is Tunisia was about 97% in 2008, among the very best in the MENA region.
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monarchies, which are also known to have high education performances,
does not go at odds with this view: Just like Algeria, these countries have
spent a substantial part of their petrodollars to buy time. In none of the
latter cases, the status-quo seems a stable economico-political equilibria.
In particular, the Gulf monarchies' stability is undermined by deep contra-
dictions, the discord between religious and secular schooling, and between
women's education and their actual role in public life being only two ex-
amples of these contradictions among others (see the illuminating analysis
by Bahgat, 1998, many years before the Arab spring).24 The repression
force of the Big Brother of this region, Saudi Arabia, has been so far,
if not persuasive, certainly implacable (as it transpires from the Bahrein
case). Much of the future of this region depends on how this monarchy
will tackle its contradictions. It is far unclear whether the recent steps
taken (for example in favor of women's rights) by the King are necessary
and suﬃcient for that.
c) The interpretation of the DSC as a coordination cost is also interesting to
understand the cascade of events following the Jasmine revolution. One
can perfectly attribute to the striking success of this early revolution a sig-
niﬁcant psychological eﬀect on the Arab populations, a kind of awareness
shock easing their rallying towards a common objective. In this sense,
the Jasmine revolution has supposed a signiﬁcant drop in the DSC faced
by these populations, and therefore a larger propensity to revolt. It is
because the rulers of the Arab world are precisely aware of this driving
force that they have launched so many initiatives after the Tunisian revo-
lution towards more concessionary policies both with respect to economic
and political rights. This concerns countries of the Maghreb (Algeria and
Marocco as mentioned in the introduction) but also Gulf monarchies start-
ing with Saudi Arabia.
d) Last but not least, the demographic aspects, and in particular the relative
demographic size of the elites, are worth accounting for (see the modelling
in Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). Just like human capital accumula-
tion, demographic change involves slow dynamics and might be a good
candidate for explaining the timing of the revolts in the Arab countries.
But the Arab world demographics are tricky to model for several rea-
sons (see for example Rashad, 2000, about the demographic transition in
Arab countries), and a minimally realistic (endogenous) speciﬁcation of
these demographics would have made our analytical work quite uncom-
fortable. In our theoretical setting, population growth has a priori an
ambiguous eﬀect on the DSC: on one hand, it lowers them because repres-
sion is potentially less eﬃcient when the size of the opposition increases;
but on ther other hand, for a given ﬁxed education level, coordination
costs across a bigger population are larger leading to a DSC increment.
24See also the excellent recent book by Christopher Davidson (2013) on the sustainability
of Gulf monarchies.
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Moreover, demographic growth has also an impact on the redistribution
as it leads to a mechanical increase of the redistribution bill. Accordingly,
a straightforward extension of our model including exogenous growth of
the opposition size would deliver a threshold value for this growth rate
above which a regime change occurs.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a dynamic game to provide with a comprehensive
theory of Arab spring-type events with the following main ingredients. We have
two interacting groups, the elite vs. the citizens, two political regimes, dicta-
torship vs. a freer regime, the possibility to switch from the ﬁrst to the second
regime as a consequence of a revolution by the citizens and ﬁnally the oppor-
tunity, for the elite, to aﬀect the citizens' decision through concession and/or
repression strategies. In this framework, we provide a full characterization of
the equilibrium of our political regime switching game. First, we emphasize the
role of the direct switching cost of the citizens and of the elite's self-preservation
options. Under the concession strategy, when the switching cost is low, the elite
can't avoid the political regime change. She optimally adapts to the overthrow
of their political power by setting the rate of redistribution to the highest pos-
sible level, thereby extending the period during which she has full control on
resources. This surprising result actually illustrates the role of the timing of
events in these situations of interaction between the ruling elite and the people.
When the direct switching is high, the elite can ultimately select the equilibrium
outcome and adopt the opposite strategy, that consists in choosing the lowest
level of redistribution that allows her to stay in power forever. The same kind of
results are obtained when the elites rely on repression to keep the citizens under
control. Next, the equilibrium properties under a mix of repression and redis-
tribution are analyzed. It is shown that in situations where neither repression
(only) nor redistribution (only) protect the elite against the uprising of citizens,
a subtle mixture of the two instruments is suﬃcient to make the dictatorship
permanent. Based on our theoretical results, we ﬁnally examine the reason for
such a large variety of decisions (taken by the elites) and outcomes during the
Arab Spring events.
Our analysis can be extended in several ways. First, we may allow the elite to
revise her repression and/or redistribution strategy in face of the threat of rev-
olution. This can be done by formulating the choice of uE and rE as a regime
switching problem (and applying the methodology developed by Long et al.,
2013). Second, we should account for additional aspects of the mechanics of the
Arab Spring. In particular the role of human capital and education (through
their impact on citizens' claims for freedom) or the importance of the demo-
graphic structure seem to be crucial for understanding the timing and success
of the revolts in Arab countries. Among the other promising developments of
our work are the introduction of (endogenous) probabilities of (successful) rev-
olution, capital evasion (when the elite can divert resources to its own beneﬁt)
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and secure property rights in the second regime.
A Appendix
A.1 Assumption 2 & 3
The elite in the ﬁrst case (resp. the second case) is obtained by replacing rE = 0
(resp. uE = uE) in (5). The value of the citizens in the ﬁrst case is derived
from (6) by substituting uE with any uE .
First case: One can directly check that VE(uE) ≥ VP (uE)⇔ B ≥ ln[ (1−uE)Aδ ]
or uE ≥ 1− δA . This leads to the Assumption 2.
Second case: The citizens' value cannot be computed so easily. So we resort
to the condition that the elite's consumption is always higher than the citizens'
consumption under permanent dictatorship. A suﬃcient condition for this to
hold is CE(0) > CP (0) ⇔ rE ≤ uEAK0(δ−(1−uE)A)δ . This in turn ensures that
VE(rE) > VP (rE). All this information is summarized in Assumption 3.
A.2 Proof of proposition 1
First, K is continuous everywhere except at T , where it's only left-continuous.
The left-continuity of the capital stock at the switching date T , the general
expression of K1(t) for all t ≤ T being given in (8), implies
K1(T ) = K˜(uE)⇔ φeuEAT + (K0 − φ)e(uEA−δ)T = K˜(uE). (26)
Second, we use the fact that the switching decision is taken by citizens but
citizens don't have any inﬂuence on the dynamics of the ﬁrst regime i.e. the
value of the state at which the switch occurs is controlled by the elite. So,
condition (10) must hold, which together with (8) yields:
e−δTλ1E(T ) = e
−δT ∂V
2
E(.)
∂K
⇔ (K0 − φ)e(uEA−δ)T = K˜(uE)− χ. (27)
In sum, we are left with a system of two conditions (26)-(27) in the two
remaining unknowns φ and T . Substituting the value of φ given by (26) in (27),
one obtains
K0e
(uEA−δ)T = χ
(
1
eω(uE) − 1 + e
−δT
)
,
which must be studied to show the existence of a strictly positive and ﬁ-
nite switching date. Noticing that under Assumption 1., necessarily we have
uEA − δ > 0 for all uE , then we obtain that there exists a unique 0 <
T (uE) <∞ iﬀ K˜(uE) > K0. Finally, given that ω′(uE) = 11−uE and K˜ ′(uE) =
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−−χω′(uE)eω(uE)
(eω(uE)−1)2 < 0, K˜(u¯E) > K0 is suﬃcient to ensure existence for all
uE ∈ [uE , u¯E ]. 25
A.3 Proof of proposition 2
After direct manipulations, the derivative in (22) can be rewritten as
∂VE(uE)
∂uE
=
1
δ
{
1
1−uE
(
(1−uE)A
δ − e
ω(uE)
eω(uE)−1
)
−AT (uE)[1 + σ(uE)] + δT ′(uE)
−e−δT (uE) {T ′(uE) [(1− uE)A− δ] + Aδ } .
(28)
Under Assumption 2, it's easy to check that if uE ≥ uE = 1− δA and |σ(uE)| ≤ 1
then ∂VE(uE)∂uE < 0 for all uE ∈ [uE , u¯E ]. Hence, the optimal choice is uE = uE
(if the second order optimality condition is satisﬁed).
A.4 Proof of proposition 3
Under Assumptions 2 and 4, we have uE >
δ
A for all admissible uE . This
implies that limt→∞K(t) =∞ under a permanent regime 1 and we know that
limK→∞ ln
[
K
K−χ
]
= 0. Then, (23) is equivalent to ln
[
(1−uE)A
δ
]
− A−2δδ ≥ 0⇔
ω(uE) ≤ 0.
A.5 Proof of lemma 2 and Propositions 4 & 5
• Citizens' switching problem (Lemma 2): The opposition solves
max
T
VP (K0, T ) =
∫ T
0
ln(C1P )e
−δtdt+ e−δT [V 2P (K˜ − χ)− ψ(rE)],
The necessary optimal condition for switching is (the suﬃcient optimality con-
dition is satisﬁed):
ln
(
K˜
K˜ − χ
)
=
A
δ
− 2 + ln
(
δ
[1− uE ]A
)
− δψ(rE). (29)
Denote the RHS of (29) as ω(rE). As before, there exists a unique K˜(rE) =
χeω(rE)
eω(rE)−1 that solves (29) iﬀ ω(rE) > 0. In addition, we can deﬁne a second
critical threshold for the DSC:
ψ˜r =
1
δ
(
ln(δ)− ln[(1− uE)A] + A
δ
− 2
)
.
This is suﬃcient to state Lemma 2.
25One may be concerned with the meaning of this suﬃcient condition because till now we
haven't discussed the level of the upper bound u¯E . For the sake of simplicity, given that the
share u¯E is bounded from above by 1, we may simply replace K˜(u¯E) > K0 with the stronger
requirement: K˜(1) > K0.
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• Switching date (Proposition 4): From the transversality condition of regime
1 and the left continuity of the resource stock we obtain
φ =
(
K˜(rE)− rE
uEA
−
(
K0 − rE
uEA
))
e−uEAT
(
1− e−δT )−1
And T is implicitly given by:(
K0 − rE
uEA
)
e(uEA−δ)T = K˜(rE)− χ+
(
χ− rE
uEA
)
e−δT (30)
The condition χ > K0 is suﬃcient for the existence of a unique solution
T (rE) to this equation (for a given rE). This is the same condition as the one
derived in the draft for the concession case.
Suppose that T (rE) exists. Then, the solution corresponding to regime 1
reads as follows:{
K1(t; rE) =
(
χ− rEuEA
)
euEA(t−T (rE)) + (K˜(rE)− χ)e(uEA−δ)(t−T (rE)) + rEuEA
C1E(t; rE) = δ(K˜(rE)− χ)e(uEA−δ)(t−T (rE))
• Proof of Proposition 5:
Impact of a change in rE on consumption (other comparative statics can
easily be derived from the deﬁnition of K˜(rE) and (??)):
∂C1E(t; rE)
∂rE
= C1E(t; rE)
(
K˜ ′(rE)
K˜(rE)− χ
− (uEA− δ)T ′(rE)
)
,
From (30),
T ′(rE) =
K˜ ′(rE) + 1uEA
(
e(uEA−δ)T (rE) − e−δT (rE))
K˜(rE)− χ+ uEAuEA−δ
(
χ− rEuEA
)
e−δT (rE)
Then,
∂C1E(t;rE)
∂rE
> 0 ⇔ K˜′(rE)
K˜(rE)−χ > (uEA − δ)T
′(rE), which after straight-
forward manipulations, is equivalent to:
uEA
uEA− δ
K˜ ′(rE)
K˜(rE)− χ
(
χ− rE
uEA
)
>
1
uEA
(
euEAT (rE) − 1
)
. (31)
Denote the RHS of the inequality by G(rE). This function is increasing in
rE . Let's deﬁne
σ(K˜) =
rEK˜
′(rE)
K˜(rE)
> 0 and σ(ψ′) = −rEψ
′′(rE)
ψ′(rE)
> 0
If σ(ψ′) > σ(K˜) for all rE ∈ [0, rE ] then, the LHS of the inequality above
is decreasing in rE . Let F (rE) be this LHS. Now, imposing F (rE) > G(rE) is
suﬃcient to conclude that C1E(t; rE) is increasing in rE for all t ≥ 0.
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Optimal choice of the repression level rE ∈ [0, rE ]: The present value of the
elite when she uses repression but the revolution occurs in ﬁnite time is:
VE(rE) =
∫ T (rE)
0
ln(C1E(t; rE))e
−δtdt+ e−δT (rE)V 2E(K˜(rE)− χ),
Taking the derivative w.r.t rE , one obtains:
∂VE(rE)
∂rE
=

∫ T (rE)
0
∂C1E(t;rE)
∂rE
C1E(t;rE)
e−δtdt
+
(
ln(C1E(T (rE); rE)− δV 2E(K˜(rE)− χ)
)
T ′(rE)e−δT (rE)
+
∂V 2E
∂K K˜
′(rE)e−δT (rE).
This can be decomposed into 3 diﬀerent eﬀects: the marginal impact of
choosing rE before the regime change (ﬁrst term); the marginal impact at this
instant of the regime change (second term) and the marginal impact of varying
rE after the switch (last term). Using the expression of C
1
E , this derivative can
be rewritten as:
∂VE(rE)
∂rE
=
1
δ
(
K˜ ′(rE)
K˜(rE)− χ
−
(
uEA− δ + (A(1− uE)− δ)e−δT (rE)
)
T ′(rE)
)
,
which is positive under the same two conditions that yield a consumption in-
creasing in rE .
33
References
[1] Acemoglu, D. & J. Robinson, 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship
and Democracy, Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number
9780521855266.
[2] Acemoglu, D. & J. Robinson, 2008. Persistence of Power, Elites, and Insti-
tutions, American Economic Review, vol. 98(1), pages 267-293.
[3] Acemoglu, D., M. Golosov, A. Tsyvinski & P. Yared, 2012. A Dynamic
Theory of Resource Wars, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 127(1),
pages 283-331.
[4] Achy, L., 2011. Why did protests in Algeria fail to gain momentum?,
Carnegie Middle East Center ? Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.
[5] Bahgat, G., 1998. The silent revolution: Education and instability in the
Gulf Monarchies, The Fletcher Forum of World Aﬀairs, vol. 22, 103-112.
[6] Becker, G. & K. Murphy, 1992. The division of labor, coordination costs and
knowledge, Quarterly Journal of Economics vol. 107, pages 1137-1160.
[7] Boucekkine, R. & R. Bouklia-Hassane, 2011. Rente, corruption et vio-
lence : l'émergence d'un ordre nouveau dans les pays arabes ?, Regards
Economiques vol. 92.
[8] Boucekkine, R., J. Krawczyk and T. Vallée, 2011. Environmental quality
versus economic performance: A dynamic game approach, Optimal Control
Applications and Methods vol. 32, pages 29-46.
[9] Boucekkine, R., A. Pommeret & F. Prieur, 2013a. Optimal regime switch-
ing and threshold eﬀects, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol.
37(12), pages 2979-2997.
[10] Boucekkine, R., F. Prieur & K. Puzon, 2013b. The Dynamics of Lobbying
under Uncertainty: On Political Liberalization in Arab Countries, forthcom-
ing in: Dynamic Games in Economics, Haunschmied, Veliov and Wrzaczek
(Eds.), Springer-Verlag.
[11] Caselli, F. & W. Coleman, 2006. On the Theory of Ethnic Conﬂict, NBER
Working Papers 12125, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[12] Caselli, F. & T. Cunningham, 2009. Leader behaviour and the natural
resource curse, Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(4),
pages 628-650, October.
[13] Collier, P. & A. Hoeer, 2004. Greed and grievance in civil war, Oxford
Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 563-595, Octo-
ber.
34
[14] Davidson, C., 2013. After the Sheikhs: the coming collapse of the Gulf
monarchies, Oxford University Press.
[15] Dunne, M. & M. Revkin, 2011. Egypt: How a Lack of Political Reform Un-
dermined Economic Reform, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
[16] Gonzalez, F. 2007. Eﬀective property rights, conﬂict and growth, Journal
of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 127-139, November.
[17] Hodler, R. 2006. The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries,
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1367-1386, August.
[18] Hoel, M. 1978. Distribution and growth as a diﬀerential game between
workers and capitalists, International Economic Review, vol. 19, pages 335-
350.
[19] Lancaster, K. 1973. The dynamic ineﬃciency of capitalism, Journal of Po-
litical Economy, vol. 81, pages 1092-1109.
[20] Lane, P. & A. Tornell, 1996. Power, Growth, and the Voracity Eﬀect, Jour-
nal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 213-41, June.
[21] Long, N.V., F. Prieur, K. Puzon & M. Tidball, 2013. Markov Perfect Equi-
libria in Diﬀerential Games with Regime Switching, Working Papers 13-06,
LAMETA, University of Montpellier, revised March 2013.
[22] Mehlum, H., K. Moene, & R. Torvik, 2006. Institutions and the Resource
Curse, Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 1-
20.
[23] van der Ploeg, F. & D. Rohner, 2012. War and natural resource exploita-
tion, European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1714-1729.
[24] Tornell, A. 1996. Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property
Rights, Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 2. pages 219-250.
[25] Torvik, R. 2002. Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare, Journal of
Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 455-470, April.
[26] Traub, J., 2012. The reform of the King, Foreign Policy, October 2012.
35
